



# RELIGION IN TIMES OF WAR

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MONITORING OF DAMAGED BUILDINGS AND CHANGES IN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

(February 24, 2022 – August 24, 2024) | PROJECT RELIGION ON FIRE REPORT



*Religion in Times of War: Monitoring of Damaged Buildings and Changes in Community Activities. Project Religion on Fire Report*  
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The project *Religion on Fire: Documenting Russia's War Crimes Against Religious Communities of Ukraine* was initiated in March 2022 by the NGO *Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions* and supported by state institutions and public organizations. The project aims to record and document facts of damage to religious buildings caused by Russian military aggression, as well as to analyze changes in Ukraine's religious communities following the full-scale invasion. The collected materials may be used in academic research on the impact of the war on Ukraine's religious life, in preparing reports for domestic and international public and human rights organizations. All materials will be transferred to government and law enforcement agencies to restore justice and hold the aggressor state accountable.

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
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TWO AND A HALF  
YEARS OF FULL-SCALE WAR



During the 33 years of Ukraine's independence, thanks to the open state policy regarding religious communities and the activity of believers, a unique European religious landscape was formed. Its features became diversity and an extensive network of religious organizations. After the illegal occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2014, three different legal systems were formed to control the activities of religious organizations. On the territory of Ukraine there has been functioning a legal system with an inherent respect for religious pluralism, the right of citizens to profess and practice any religion without even the official registration of a religious organization, and with easy and clear requirements for registration. Therefore, before the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, an extensive religious network existed on the controlled territory of Ukraine: more than 19,800 Orthodox (two large churches – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, as well as several smaller churches), more than 5,200 Catholic (Roman Catholic Church, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and others), more than 3,000 Baptist, as many as 3,000 communities of Christians of Evangelical Faith, more than 900 – Jehovah's Witnesses, as well as numerous other religious communities, none of which claimed complete dominance, but its believers could freely profess and preach their doctrine.


## Religious Organizations in Ukraine



\* Numbers as of January 1, 2021

Since 2014, Russia's religious legal system has been functioning de-facto in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, although the authorities granted religious organizations a two-year transition period to assimilate this system and re-register in accordance with the Russian legislation. By the beginning of 2016, about 400 religious organizations had re-registered, others ceased to exist or left the Russian legal field. Since the occupant administration does not provide official information about religious organizations in Crimea in recent years, it is possible to look on the data of various organizations, which vary from more than 700 to more than 900 religious organizations that were registered in Crimea by the end of 2021. Thus, according to the Great Russian Encyclopedia's website, with the reference to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, there are about 806 religious organizations registered in Crimea as of December 2021.<sup>1</sup> The website of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom reports on more than 900 religious organizations registered in Crimea as of September 2022.<sup>2</sup> In any case, this is much less than the 2,220 religious organizations that functioned in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea at the beginning of 2014. The example of the Crimean Diocese of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which was in fact abolished by the occupant authorities and about 50 of its parishes ceased to exist, is particularly illustrative. In 2023, the Russian authorities expropriated the Cathedral of the Holy and Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Volodymyr and Princess Olga in Simferopol, and all priests of the OCU left the peninsula.

### Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Number of registered religious organizations)



In some areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (ORDLO), which were de facto under the control of the Russian Federation but officially joined it only in 2022, the situation differed from that in Crimea. For several years, religious organizations, even if they were ready to function on the territory of ORDLO, did not have clear "rules of the game" that would allow them to do so. At the same time, there were repressions and extrajudicial reprisal of representatives of the denominations

<sup>1</sup> Республика Крым. Научно-образовательный портал «Большая российская энциклопедия». URL: <https://bigenc.ru/c/krym-312b1b> (accessed: 03.06.2024).

<sup>2</sup> Russia's Religious Freedom Violations in Ukraine. US Commission on International Religious Freedom: official website. URL: <https://www.uscifr.gov/publications/russias-religious-freedom-violations-ukraine> (accessed: 03.06.2024).

that did not find support among the local authorities. Thus, in Slovyansk, four members of the Pentecostal church Transfiguration of the Lord were captured and killed during the service in June 8-9, 2014. The number of killed or abducted since has been only growing. Regulatory documents on religious life in ORDLO were adopted in the “Donetsk People Republic” on June 24, 2016, and in the “Luhansk People Republic” on June 2, 2018. Both documents correspond to Russian legislation and are even harsher: the “LPR” law is quite strict about religious groups as an organizational form and religious organizations that do not belong to officially recognized churches and associations; the “DPR” law introduced the concept of “religious sect” to the legal framework, which was not found in the current Russian law. At the same time, the optimization of the legal model and the unification of the power vertical, accompanied by the killings of field commanders, made the situation in ORDLO more stable. The Russian authorities were even able to organize the visit of Claudio Gugerotti, the Apostolic Nuncio, to Donetsk and Lugansk in 2016–2017.

In 2022, as a result of the large-scale Russian invasion, the territories of Ukraine beyond the borders of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which were previously de facto controlled by the Russian Federation, were officially declared a part of Russia by the Russian authorities. This fact led to the extension of the Russian legal model and practical state-church relations in the occupied territory, for example, the functioning of various religious movements, which were recognized as extremist in the Russian Federation, was put to an end. Only in 2022–2023, at least 32 cases of forced seizure of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious premises in favor of the occupation administrations in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions were documented (the activity of the Kingdom Halls of Jehovah’s Witnesses was abolished much earlier in the territories that were occupied before 2022, when Russia banned this religious organization in 2017).<sup>3</sup>

As a result of the full-scale invasion, the number of violations of international humanitarian laws, including those that could be qualified as war crimes, has significantly increased, in particular, the systematic destruction of religious buildings. The armed forces of the Russian Federation also regularly shell residential buildings, social and energy infrastructure, and cultural heritage. Therefore, as of February 24, 2024, 1,525 medical facilities were damaged and another 196 were completely destroyed,<sup>4</sup> 3,790 educational institutions were damaged or destroyed.<sup>5</sup> The total number of criminal proceedings related to war crimes and crimes of aggression is already about 134,000. The scale of hostilities and numerous violations impose an extraordinary burden on the judicial system and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine. Therefore, not only state institutions, but non-governmental organizations are actively involved in the documentation of military atrocities, including the team of the Religion on Fire project, initiated by members of the Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions in the first days of March 2022. We collect and analyze information from open sources

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<sup>3</sup> Monitoring data was provided to Religion on Fire project team by a representative of Jehovah’s Witnesses religious community.

<sup>4</sup> 865 пошкоджених об’єктів медичних закладів України вже частково або повністю відновлені. Міністерство охорони здоров’я України: офіційний веб-сайт. URL: <https://moz.gov.ua/article/news/865-poshkodzhenih-ob-e2%80%99ektiv-medichnih-zakladiv-ukraini-vzhe-chastkovo-abo-povnistju-vidnovleni> (accessed: 03.06.2024).

<sup>5</sup> Україна: тяжкі наслідки війни для закладів освіти та майбутнього дітей. Human Rights Watch: website. URL: <https://www.hrw.org/uk/news/2023/11/08/ukraine-wars-toll-schools-childrens-future> (accessed: 03.06.2024).

about destroyed and damaged religious buildings and abused religious figures, and conduct our own field trips to the liberated territories as well. As of August 24, 2024, the project data base has information about at least 590 religious buildings damaged or completely destroyed in the Russian-Ukrainian war. This information is passed to law enforcement agencies and the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (SSEFC). The Religion on Fire project team cooperates with international and Ukrainian human rights organizations and scientific institutions, academic researchers of religion, and media.

The norms of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) protect religious buildings and places of worship, therefore a deliberate attack on them may qualify as a war crime. The prohibition of attacking any religious buildings is stated in the Art. 53 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (12 August 1949), relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977), in the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (29 March 1999) and other sources. Religion on Fire project team, together with IHL specialists – representatives of the NGO Support for Fundamental Research Fund, – has studied a number of cases that could be qualified as war crimes (deliberate shelling of a religious building, indiscriminate shelling with the use of prohibited means of destruction, etc.).<sup>6</sup> At the same time, other gross violations of IHL have been recorded, including abduction, torture, murder of religious leaders, looting of religious communities by Russian military personnel, and the use of religious buildings for military purposes. These crimes also fall under Art. 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, according to which the national justice system brings proceedings before a court.

Two and a half years of full-scale war have demonstrated that the religious dynamics in Ukraine does not comprise exclusively the destruction of religious buildings and persecution of believers in the occupied territories. However, religious organizations have become part of the system of resistance and resilience of the Ukrainian society. From the first days of the full-scale invasion, they have been providing humanitarian aid, supporting the Defense Forces, taking care of the vulnerable categories of the population. The importance of continuing religious life in the communities manifested in the fact, that many religious buildings which suffered minor damage had already been restored and the religious services are carried on.<sup>7</sup> Along with this, numerous controversial news about religious organizations (from clerical collaboration to mobilization evasion schemes and scandals related to individual religious leaders) can damage their credibility gained in the first year of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. Thus, according to the annual Razumkov Center survey, the Church (religious organizations) was considered a moral authority by 49% of respondents in 2022, while not considered by 33%, and in 2023, 44% answered the same question positively, and

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
<sup>6</sup> Короткий Т., Савченко Я., Халіков Р. Чому важливо документувати воєнні злочини проти релігійних споруд і як робити це правильно. Юридична газета online: всеукраїнське професійне юридичне видання. URL: <https://yur-gazeta.com/publications/practice/mizhnarodne-pravo-investiciyi/chomu-vazhlivo-dokumentuvati-voenni-zlochiny-proti-religiynih-sporud-i-yak-robiti-ce-pravilno.html> (accessed: 03.03.2024).

<sup>7</sup> In particular, according to the Kyiv Regional Military Administration, as of mid-2023, more than 10% of the damaged religious buildings in the region had been repaired, while some others were still under repair. The field team of the Religion on Fire project also received information about restored religious buildings in other regions, although no official statistics are kept there.

40% negatively. The share of those who do not trust the Church also increased: from 19% in 2022 to 28% in 2023.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, another less specialized Razumkov Center survey showed that 27.8% of Ukrainians did not trust the Church in March 2024, and in June this percentage decreased to 25.5%.<sup>9</sup>

## The Attitude of the Ukrainian People to Religious Organizations

(Razumkov Center survey)



*Religion on Fire* project team conducted a series of interviews with representatives of religious communities of various denominations in different regions of Ukraine to learn from their experiences and analyze changes in religious communities during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Based on these interviews and additional sources, certain trends in the life of religious communities were traced and they are represented in a separate section of this report.

<sup>8</sup> Українське суспільство, держава і церква під час війни. Церковно-релігійна ситуація в Україні-2023. URL: <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/12/19/2023-Religiya-F.pdf> (accessed: 03.03.2024).

<sup>9</sup> Оцінка ситуації в країні, довіра до соціальних інститутів, політиків, посадовців та громадських діячів, ставлення до виборів, віра в перемогу (червень 2024р.). URL: <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-sytuatsii-v-kraini-dovira-do-sotsialnykh-institutiv-politykiv-posadovtsiv-ta-gromadskykh-diiachiv-stavlennia-do-vyboriv-vira-v-peremogu-cherven-2024r> (accessed: 23.07.2024).

# DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY



Religion on Fire project team has created a database with information regularly updated, and a new one added over two and a half years. It keeps record of the cases of destruction and damage of religious buildings during military actions and attacks, as well as acts of violence toward religious actors. Destroyed or damaged religious buildings are systematized chronologically, by damage degree, geographical criteria, and religious affiliation. The database keeps detailed information on the time, place, and course of the events, damage type and degree, and whether or not the case constitutes a military crime or other violations of the international law. The full database is not being made public for security reasons at this time, but it is available upon request to government authorities, law enforcement agencies, human rights organizations, non-governmental organizations, and academic institutions.

Targeting broader audience, the project team created a website Religion on Fire,<sup>10</sup> which contains information about over 300 religious buildings that have been damaged or destroyed. The updated statistical data, which reflects the quantity of damaged or destroyed religious buildings in infographics, is regularly published on Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions social media pages (Facebook,<sup>11</sup> Twitter.<sup>12</sup>)

## Methods of Data Collection:



Systematical monitoring of open sources



Field trips



Internal monitoring data

The **systematical monitoring** of open sources is carried out by the project team, including the official websites and social media pages of religious organizations, religious information resources, military and state reports regarding the damages to religious buildings because of the military actions. The project team regularly monitors over 150 open sources.

**Field trips** are conducted by the members of the project field team Ruslan Khalikov and Anton Leshchynskyi. They visit the cities and towns, which were shelled or occupied by the Russian military, attend to every place without regard to religious affiliation in a city or town, verify information

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
<sup>10</sup> Religion on Fire: website. URL: <https://uk.religiononfire.mar.in.ua/> (accessed: 08.07.2024).

<sup>11</sup> Офіційна сторінка ГО "Майстерня академічного релігієзнавства" у соціальній мережі "Фейсбук". URL: <https://www.facebook.com/officialmarinua> (accessed: 08.07.2024).

<sup>12</sup> The official page of Religion on Fire project in social media X. URL: [https://x.com/Religion\\_Fire](https://x.com/Religion_Fire) (accessed: 08.07.2024).

retrieved from open sources, create a protocol of damages and destructions of different degrees, and communicate with religious organizations' members and witnesses.

The fieldwork team visited Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, and Donetsk regions from May 14, 2022, to July 24, 2024. In Kyiv region, they visited 61 settlements in Bucha, Vyshhorod, Fastiv, and Brovary districts. In Chernihiv region, fieldwork was conducted in the city of Chernihiv and Lukashivka village. In Zhytomyr region, field trips were conducted to the settlements in the Korosten district. In Kharkiv region, fieldwork covered the cities of Kharkiv, Derhachi, Merefa, Izyum, and Balakliya, as well as several settlements of Kharkiv, Izyum, and Chuhuyiv districts. In Donetsk region, four towns of Kramatorsk district were visited. In total, fieldwork was carried out in 87 towns in five regions of Ukraine. 237 religious objects were visited, and the evidence of their destruction or damage was recorded.



Internal monitoring data is obtained from the representatives of religious organizations and their press services, which collect information about the damaged buildings within their religious community or administration. The project team collaborates with the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, as well as regional state and military administrations, sharing information with them about damaged religious buildings.



## Challenges in Data Collection:



Data collection from occupied territories



Incomplete or unverified information



Difficulties in identification of the location of a religious building



Unwillingness to communicate

Data collection from occupied territories and those where active military actions occur is very limited for fieldwork. In the flow of time, testimony or general information about the building destruction or damage can be incomplete or cannot be verified. This also makes it impossible to gather complete statistical data about damaged or destroyed religious buildings at current moment. It is expected that after Ukraine's victory new information about damage or destruction will become available, and sadly, new entries will be added to the project database.

**Incomplete or unverified information** about damage or destruction of religious buildings is caused by uneven coverage of information on official sources of various religious organizations of Ukraine (some report it in great detail, others avoid the subject of the war and its consequences for their religious communities). Light damage to religious buildings is often not taken into account and are not recorded at all. These damages are fixed by the religious community, they are not recording or documenting the fact of damage as a result of Russian army actions.

**Identifying the location of a religious building** and its geographical coordinates is an essential stage in damage documentation. The problem of location identification resulted in several legal and practical difficulties. For example, the legal address of registration sometimes differs from the actual place of religious activities, which is impossible to identify in open sources. This problem concerns religious buildings located on the territory of medical and educational institutions, in small villages and so on, as well as identifying "minor" buildings of religious services (such as chapels, roadside memorials, crosses etc.).

**Unwillingness to communicate** with *Religion on Fire* project team: the critical part of fieldwork is collecting testimonies and interviews with witnesses of the destruction or damage of religious buildings. However, people refuse to recall past events for different reasons. When the project team contacted potential respondents with the inquiry for an interview about the changes in religious communities as a consequence of the Russian-Ukrainian war, some religious leaders refused to communicate. They considered it dangerous to talk about their religious community and thus draw attention to their activities because it could be a pretext for Russian aggressors to physically attack the community or legally persecute it.


# MONITORING RESULTS

According to the open sources monitoring results, as of August 24, 2024, there were at least 590 religious buildings damaged or destroyed, listing: churches, mosques, synagogues, chapels, prayer houses, Kingdom Halls, cemeteries, memorial signs and religious educational institutions. It is worth noting that as of February 24, 2023, there were 415 such objects.<sup>13</sup>

Since the data collecting methodology relies mostly upon the analysis of open sources, the data is incomplete. The mass of the damaged objects belongs to the now-occupied territories of Ukraine, making it impossible for Religion on Fire project team to access them. In addition, the information on the destruction of some of the churches may appear on social media of some eparchies much later, than the destruction had taken place. This fact allows us to suggest with a certain degree of confidence, that the number of destroyed or damaged buildings is much higher than it is publicly known so far.

46 buildings are destroyed completely, 88 buildings are severely damaged. Both types of damage make impossible for the buildings to be used in religious activities without complete reconstruction. The majority of buildings were moderately or lightly damaged, amounting 382 buildings. Currently it is impossible to estimate the damage inflicted to 18 objects.


## Degree of Damage of Religious Buildings



The biggest number of the destroyed or damaged religious buildings, namely, 123, are located in Donetsk region; between 72 to 86 damaged buildings are documented in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Kherson, and Kyiv regions. Scarce number of destroyed or damaged religious buildings are in Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Odesa, Poltava, Ternopil, Mykolayiv, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernihiv regions.









<sup>13</sup> Basauri Ziuzina Anna Mariya, Fenno Iryna, Khalikov Ruslan, Leshchynskyi Anton, Nikiforov Karen, Pidhorna Liliya, Sevastyaniv Ulyana. Religion on Fire: Report on the results of monitoring of damage and destruction of religious buildings as a result of the full-scale Russian military invasion of Ukraine. Kyiv, 2023. P. 13. URL: <https://www.mar.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Religion-on-Fire-report-2023-ENG.pdf> (accessed: 17.07.2024).

## Damaged or Destroyed Religious Buildings in Ukraine



Among the religious denominations, the largest number of religious buildings that were destroyed or damaged as a result of Russian military aggression belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (310 or 53.4%). Another 171 buildings belong to Protestant religious communities, of which 77 are Kingdom Halls of Jehovah’s Witnesses. 53 churches belong to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Additionally, 15 buildings are associated with Judaism, 9 with the Roman Catholic Church, 7 each with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Muslim communities, and 2 with the International Society for Krishna Consciousness.

## Destroyed and Damaged Religious Buildings as a Result of the War with Russian Federation

	Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)	<b>310</b>		Islamic	<b>7</b>
	Orthodox Church of Ukraine	<b>53</b>		Jewish	<b>15</b>
	Greek and Roman Catholic	<b>16</b>		Religious educational institutions	<b>9</b>
	Protestant	<b>171</b>		Other religious objects	<b>9</b>
<b>TOTAL 590</b>					

The Russian invasion has also dealt an irreversible damage to the cultural heritage objects of Ukraine, among which religious architectural monuments rank the highest. Among such damaged monuments is one of the oldest brick-built churches of Kharkiv region, the Transfiguration Cathedral in Izyum, built in 1684–1685;<sup>14</sup> and one of the oldest churches of Donetsk region — St. George Church in Oleksandro-Shyltyne, which was constructed in 1822.<sup>15</sup>

Monitoring data indicates that the impact of military action on the territory of Ukraine has been particularly severe on religious minorities. These communities are smaller in numbers, and they usually have less financial capacity. In case of the destruction of a community's only religious building, this community does not have a place to meet and de facto ceases to exist, as was the case with the Karaite community in Kharkiv. Migration also has a negative impact on religious communities. As before, it continues to have the greatest impact on small communities, because they are unable to resume their activities after their members' relocation to other regions of Ukraine or abroad.

<sup>14</sup> Знищена краса: храми Ізюмщини. Слобідський край URL: <https://www.slk.kh.ua/news/khronograf/znisena-krasa-hrami-izumsini.html> (accessed: 01.08.2024).

<sup>15</sup> На Донеччині у результаті обстрілу пошкоджено древній Георгіївський храм УПЦ. Синодальний інформаційно-просвітницький відділ УПЦ. URL: <https://news.church.ua/2023/09/06/na-donechchini-u-rezultati-obstrilu-poshodzheno-drevnij-georgijivskij-xram-upc/#2024-04-01> (accessed: 01.08.2024).

# HOW THE FULL-SCALE WAR AFFECTS THE ACTIVITIES OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

In addition to gathering information from open sources about damaged and destroyed religious buildings, Religion on Fire project team has been conducting interviews with religious leaders and representatives of religious communities since November 2022.<sup>16</sup> These interviews help to comprehend and document not only the destruction affecting Ukraine's religious landscape but the changes taking place within religious communities as well.

The questions in the interviews can be roughly divided into three sections: about the state and functioning of the religious community before the full-scale invasion of Russian army into Ukraine, about the actions of the community's leadership and its believers during the first days and months of the war, and about the changes in the communities which were brought about by the war.

The most obvious factor affecting the dynamics within religious communities is the migration caused by the occupation and military actions on the territory of Ukraine. It's important to note that this factor influences changes in religious communities not only within the Ukrainian borders but also in neighboring European countries is also noticeable. Somewhat smaller yet noticeable the global impact of the religious migration of Ukrainians. According to the data collected by the civic network Opora from various sources, between 5 to 8 million people have left Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.<sup>17</sup> The majority of Ukrainian citizens who fled during the Russo-Ukrainian war now reside in Poland, Germany, and the United States. Migrants not only try to adapt to new conditions but also often continue to preserve their culture, including religion. This trend has led to the foundation of new religious communities abroad, formed by Ukrainian refugees. According to Archpriest Volodymyr Melnychuk of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, during two years of war, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) has opened about 100 new parishes in Europe.<sup>18</sup> In some countries, the communities of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) have also emerged, but they operate as chaplaincy missions, as the OCU faces restrictions in founding official communities in diaspora.

## External and Internal Migration



### External Migration

Between 5 to 8 million Ukrainians left the country



### Internal Migration

About 5 million Ukrainians have the status of internally displaced persons

<sup>16</sup> Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions: official website. URL: <https://www.mar.in.ua/blog-page-ua/> (accessed: 06.08.2024).

<sup>17</sup> Кількість українців та їх міграція за кордон через війну — дослідження Громадянської мережі ОПОРА. Опора: офіційний сайт. URL:

<https://www.oporaua.org/viyana/kilkist-ukrayintsiv-ta-yikh-migratsiia-za-kordon-cherез-viinu-doslidzhennia-gromadianskoyi-merezhi-opora-24791#%D0%92%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83%D0%BF> (accessed: 06.08.2024).

<sup>18</sup> Глуховський М. Полювання за вірянами, або Неймовірні пригоди московських священників в Італії. Главком: онлайн медіа. URL: <https://glavcom.ua/interviews/poljuvannja-za-virjanami-abo-nejmovirni-prihodi-moskovskikh-svjashchennikov-v-italiji-994307.html> (accessed: 06.08.2024).

One of the examples of the foundations of new religious communities of Ukrainians in Germany is the Orthodox community in Berlin. According to Father Dmytro Dziadevych, this initiative was led by the UOC (MP), but only the presence of priests and believers made the foundation of such a community possible. Initially, the parish was allowed to hold Sunday services in the Catholic church of Kriskonig, and later the parish was able to serve in another Catholic church in central Berlin, the Michaelkirche. The first service took place on January 7, 2024, on Christmas and was attended by about 500 people. Approximately 150 believers attend Sunday services, the vast majority of them (60%) are migrants from Ukraine who have been living in Berlin since 2022.<sup>19</sup>

While the establishment of new religious communities abroad can be considered a positive trend, as it enriches the religious landscape of other countries and provides opportunities for Ukrainians to satisfy their religious needs abroad, the migration has also led to negative consequences for the religious communities, which are relatively small. Due to military actions, the members of some small religious communities have flee the country, and these communities have completely ceased their activities. For example, this happened to the Karaites community in Kharkiv.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to the migration abroad, about 5 million people in Ukraine have the status of internally displaced persons.<sup>21</sup> For the religious landscape of Ukraine, this means that some religious communities disappear from certain territories (the East and occupied regions), while in other territories (large cities in Central and Western Ukraine), the existing communities are growing because of the new members, who also replace those believers who have left for abroad.

The internal migration also affects the demographic composition of many religious communities in Ukraine. The believers, who have left the Eastern regions of Ukraine, have joined religious communities in Central and Western Ukraine. For example, the communities of Conservative Judaism in Odesa and Chernivtsi are now mostly composed of displaced persons from Eastern Ukraine.<sup>22</sup> It is plausible to suggest that the religious communities in the occupied territories or areas with active combat operations are primarily composed of elderly people, as most middle-aged and young believers have left their homes.

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<sup>19</sup> Nikiforov K. "Invaders hoped that the Church would happily embrace them but their expectations didn't come true", – Father Dmytro Dziadevych. Interview. Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions: website. URL:

<https://www.mar.in.ua/%d0%be%d0%ba%d1%83%d0%bf%d0%b0%d0%bd%d1%82%d0%b8-%d1%81%d0%bf%d0%be%d0%b4%d1%96%d0%b2%d0%b0%d0%bb%d0%b8%d1%81%d1%8f-%d1%89%d0%be-%d1%86%d0%b5%d1%80%d0%ba%d0%b2%d0%b0-%d0%b7%d1%83%d1%81%d1%82/> (accessed:16.06.2024).

<sup>20</sup> Private conversation with the representative of the Karaite community in Ukraine, archive of Religion on Fire project.

<sup>21</sup> Кількість українців та їх міграція за кордон через війну — дослідження Громадянської мережі ОПОРА. Опора: вебсайт. URL:

<https://www.oporaua.org/viyana/kilkist-ukrayintsiv-ta-yikh-migratsiia-za-kordon-cherez-viinu-doslidzhennia-gromadianskoyi-merezhi-opora-24791#%D0%92%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83%D0%BF> (accessed: 16.06.2024).

<sup>22</sup> Gascon Barbera M. Many Ukrainian Jews Have Left over 2 Years of War. Many Others Are Still Invested in Their Local Communities. J. (blog). URL: <https://jweekly.com/2024/03/19/many-ukrainian-jews-have-left-over-2-years-of-war-many-others-are-still-invested-in-their-local-communities/> (accessed: 20.06.2024).



Currently, we have the least information about the activities of religious communities in the occupied territories. The repressive policy of the Russian occupying authorities toward “non-traditional” religious communities (such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and followers of Said Nursi) is well known, but the representatives of the OCU and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) are also being persecuted. One of the most well-known cases is that of Serhii Chudynovych, a priest from Kherson, who, after being forced to cooperate with the occupiers, escaped to Kyiv. He reported that both his OCU community and he personally were under constant surveillance by the Russian occupying authorities. People were intimidated, and it is obvious that under such conditions, the religious community could not function properly. In mid-2022, he noted that he continued to hold online services to keep in touch with the believers: “I gather my community, which has now left Kherson (those who actually attended our church in Kherson), and there are also parishioners who watch the liturgy online and are connected to our community in Northern Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Slovakia, a few people in the Czech Republic, Turkey, Spain, and Italy.”<sup>23</sup>

According to the Department of Religious Freedom of Mission Eurasia, “during the autumn-winter of 2022 and spring of 2023, almost all non-Orthodox churches in the occupied territories were deprived of the right to hold services.” However, religious leaders in the occupied territories continued their activities underground, prompting the occupying authorities to begin persecuting them. The authors of a report prepared by Mission Eurasia, citing the publication *Verstka*, mention 43 cases of targeted persecution of clergy.<sup>24</sup>

Another important change in the activities of religious communities is their conscious Ukrainian self-identification. This is reflected not only in believers transitioning to Ukrainian in their everyday communication but also in changing the language of services from Russian to Ukrainian. For example, the Jewish community of Ukraine, in addition to the traditional use of Hebrew, often used Russian during religious services. However, in 2023, for the first time the Passover Haggadah was translated into Ukrainian.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Самохвалова Л. Сергій Чудинович, священник ПЦУ. Катуючи мене, росіяни говорили: «Ну ти зрозумів, що твій Христос – фігня?..». Інтерв'ю. Укрінформ: новинний сайт. URL: [https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3507524-sergij-cudinovic-svasennik-pcu.html#google\\_vignette](https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3507524-sergij-cudinovic-svasennik-pcu.html#google_vignette) (accessed: 16.06.2024).

<sup>24</sup> Брицин М., Васін М. Віра під вогнем: досліджуючи релігійну свободу в умовах війни в Україні / Франклін, Теннессі, США: Місія Євразія, 2023. – 28 с. URL: <https://missioneurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2023.12-Mission-Eurasia-report-on-Ukraine-UKR-A4-web-version.pdf> (accessed: 16.06.2024).

<sup>25</sup> Михайлов Д. Текст Пасхальної Гагади вперше переклали українською мовою з івриту. Суспільне Новини: інтернет-видання. URL: <https://suspilne.media/412521-tekst-pashalnoi-gagadi-vperse-pereklali-ukrainskou-movou-z-ivritu/> (accessed: 24.06.2024).

# Changes in the Activities of Religious Communities



One of the aspects reflecting the Ukrainian self-identification of Orthodox believers is the transition of communities from the UOC (MP) to the OCU. Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 630 communities have transitioned to the OCU. However, it is important to understand that this is only the legal aspect of the transition, as sometimes there may not be an actual group of believers behind the legal entity of a religious community.<sup>26</sup> According to the sociological study conducted by the Razumkov Center in 2023, the number of OCU supporters has been increasing: in 2020 – 20%, in 2021 – 24%, in 2022 – 36%, and in 2023 – 42%. Meanwhile, the number of those identifying as UOC (MP) believers has decreased from 13% in 2021 to 6% in 2023.<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, the Razumkov Center's 2022 study noted that "belonging to a particular church does not necessarily mean belonging to a religious community," as only 41% of the UOC (MP) believers reported their membership in a community, compared to 30% for the OCU.<sup>28</sup>

Adapting to the wartime conditions, the religious communities have significantly strengthened their humanitarian, social, and psychological activities, which they had already been performing before the full-scale invasion. However, new types of efforts emerged, such as providing assistance to the military by collecting donations from their congregations to purchase vehicles, drones, or night-vision devices. Religious communities abroad also assist greatly, especially in providing financial support.

Most religious leaders interviewed by Religion on Fire project team reported an intensification of humanitarian efforts during the first months of the war when people urgently needed basic things (food and medicine). Later, religious communities began establishing "invincibility points," where believers could take shelter during air raids, recharge devices, get fuel etc. Many religious communities also started to offer psychological services to their members. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) created the guide titled Emotional Resilience, which combines sacred texts with psychological support exercises. LDS conducts trainings for their members on how to use this guide, and they help each other cope with complex emotional challenges.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Гірна Д. Переходи в ПЦУ. Історична правда: інтернет-видання. URL: <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2024/01/5/163523/> (accessed: 02.08.2024).

<sup>27</sup> Рівень релігійності, довіра до Церкви, конфесійний розподіл та міжцерковні відносини в українському суспільстві (листопад 2023 р.). Сайт Українського центру економічних і політичних досліджень імені Олександра Разумкова. URL: <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/riven-reliiynosti-dovira-do-tserkvy-konfesiinyi-rozpodil-ta-mizhtserkovni-vidnosyny-v-ukrainskomu-suspilstvi-lystopad-2023r> (accessed: 16.08.2024).

<sup>28</sup> Українське суспільство, держава і церква під час війни. Церковно-релігійна ситуація в Україні-2023. Інформаційні матеріали підготовлені в рамках діяльності Круглого столу "Релігія і влада в Україні: проблеми взаємовідносин". URL: <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/12/19/2023-Religiya-F.pdf> (accessed: 03.06.2024).

<sup>29</sup> Basauri Ziuzina A.M. "Emotional support and nourishment are also a part of service", – Kateryna Serdyuk. Interview. Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions: website. URL: <https://www.mar.in.ua/%d0%b5%d0%bc%d0%be%d1%86%d1%96%d0%b9%d0%bd%d1%96-%d0%bf%d1%96%d0%b4%d1%82%d1%80%d0%b8%d0%bc%d0%ba%d0%b0-%d1%96-%d0%b6%d0%b8%d0%b2%d0%bb%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%bd%d1%8f-%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%ba%d0%be%d0%b6/> (accessed: 08.07.2024).

The shift in the activity focus of religious communities is evident not only from interviews with religious leaders but also from public opinion surveys. According to the research conducted by Razumkov Center, respondents identified the main tasks of religious communities during the war as providing psychological assistance, supporting the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and helping with citizens' social and material needs. More than 40% of Ukrainians are aware of cases when religious communities have supported the Armed Forces, sheltered refugees, or provided financial assistance: "54% of religious community members responded they received moral support from their community during the war, 47% – psychological support, and 22% – financial support."<sup>30</sup>

In their interviews, religious leaders have repeatedly mentioned instances of collaboration among several religious communities or between religious communities and charitable organizations. For example, after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chernihiv region (early April 2022), father Roman Hrydkovets of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church started working with the foundations Caritas Ukraine and Don Calabria Ukraine. He personally received and distributed food and hygiene packages to people in their chapel. Foundation Caritas Ukraine officially began operating in Chernihiv region only in October 2022. They provided the local population with heating devices, food, clothing, and also offered psychological support.<sup>31</sup>

Many religious organizations did not cease their activities after the full-scale invasion, conducting worship services and meetings online. After the COVID-19 pandemic, many communities and their members acquired basic technological skills for conducting online worship and gatherings; thus, as large-scale hostilities began, some communities reverted to this format. Later some of religious communities have restored offline services, while others continue to function online, which, of course, cannot fully replace the interaction between religious leaders and believers, as well as among believers themselves. The shift to online activities was also facilitated by the physical absence of some religious leaders in Ukraine. For instance, in the early days of the war, Julia Gris, the only female rabbi who led a community of Progressive Judaism in Odesa, left Ukraine.<sup>32</sup> As far as we know, Julia Gris regularly conducts online worship services for two Reform communities in Kyiv and Odesa.

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<sup>30</sup> Війна і церква. Церковно-релігійна ситуація в Україні 2022 р. (інформаційні матеріали). Сайт Українського центру економічних і політичних досліджень імені Олександра Разумкова. С. 106. URL: [https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/02/13/2022\\_Religiya\\_SITE.pdf](https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/02/13/2022_Religiya_SITE.pdf) (accessed: 08.07.2024).

<sup>31</sup> Fenno I. "I believe that for some reason God wanted me to be here" – Father Roman Hrydkovets. Interview. Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions: website. URL: <https://www.mar.in.ua/%d0%b2%d1%96%d1%80%d1%8e-%d1%89%d0%be-%d0%b1%d0%be%d0%b3-%d1%87%d0%be%d0%bc%d1%83%d1%81%d1%8c-%d0%b7%d0%b0%d1%85%d0%be%d1%82%d1%96%d0%b2-%d1%89%d0%be%d0%b1-%d1%8f-%d0%b1%d1%83%d0%b2-%d1%82/> (accessed: 08.07.2024).

<sup>32</sup> Gera V. Ukraine's Sole Woman Rabbi Escapes Odesa as Key Strategic City Prepares for Battle. The Times of Israel: official website. URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukraines-sole-woman-rabbi-escapes-odesa-as-key-strategic-city-prepares-for-battle/> (accessed: 18.07.2024).

A serious threat to the future of Ukrainian religious organizations in general, and religious minorities in particular, is the forced interruption in the work of religious educational institutions. The Ukrainian Evangelical Seminary, which was under occupation in the village of Berezivka (Kyiv region), resumed its activities only in February 2023.<sup>33</sup> Restoring children's educational programs is extremely difficult, as no one can guarantee the safety of children since Russian troops attack Ukrainian territories almost daily with drones and missiles.

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<sup>33</sup> Leshchinskyi A. "One copy of the Bible must have been used by the russians to annoy the dog, because the only Ukrainian Bible left was torn apart", – Andriy Shved. Interview. Workshop for the Academic Study of Religions: website. URL: <https://www.mar.in.ua/%d0%be%d0%b4%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%bc-%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%b8%d0%bc%d1%96%d1%80%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%ba%d0%be%d0%bc-%d1%83%d0%ba%d1%80%d0%b0%d1%97%d0%bd%d1%81%d1%8c%d0%ba%d0%be%d1%97-%d0%b1%d1%96%d0%b1%d0%bb/>. (accessed: 08.07.2024).

# CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

# CONCLUSIONS

1. Over the 33 years of Ukraine's independence, a unique religious network has formed within its territory, where a diverse array of religions and religious denominations coexist tolerantly.
2. After the Russian occupation of Crimea, the number of registered religious organizations on the peninsula significantly decreased, with some religious communities, such as the OCU, completely ceasing their activities. In the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, Russian legislation operates de-facto, allowing only officially recognized churches and associations to function. In 2022, the religious community of Jehovah's Witnesses, banned in Russia, was designated as an extremist organization. Since then, regular arrests and imprisonments of this community members accused of extremism or its financing have begun in Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
3. Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many organizations and institutions have started to document war crimes. As a result, Workshop for the Academic study of Religions launched the project Religion on Fire, aimed at documenting cases of damage and destruction of religious buildings in Ukraine. Within this project, a database has been created, with information that is constantly updated and supplemented. An accompanying website (with the same name) has also been created, showcasing a portion of the collected information.
4. International humanitarian law emphasizes the special protection of religious buildings by warring parties, because their attack may be classified as a war crime. Religion on Fire project has documented several instances of deliberate shelling of religious buildings, indiscriminate shelling using prohibited means of warfare, and other severe violations of international humanitarian law and regulations by Russian military forces.
5. To create a database of damaged and destroyed religious buildings, Religion on Fire project team systematically monitors over 150 open sources and has conducted field trips to towns and villages in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk regions to document instances of damage and destruction of religious buildings. The team also uses the data of internal monitoring, provided by the religious organizations themselves.
6. During data gathering, Religion on Fire project team encounters several challenges: the inability to collect data in occupied territories, incomplete or unverifiable data presented in open sources, difficulties in accurately identifying the locations of religious buildings, and the reluctance of religious representatives to engage with the project team on topics related to the war.

7. As a result of monitoring of open sources, as of August 24, 2024, at least 590 religious buildings have been damaged or destroyed. 46 buildings were completely destroyed, and 88 buildings have suffered severe damage. The highest number of religious buildings (123) were damaged or destroyed in Donetsk region, from 72 to 86 damaged buildings were documented by the project team in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Kherson, and Kyiv regions. The largest number of damaged religious buildings belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (310, or 53.4%).
8. Over the two and a half years of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, religious communities have undergone significant changes at various levels of their functioning. Based on the interviews conducted with religious leaders from different denominations, Religion on Fire team has identified the following changes as the most characteristic of the current stage of development of religious communities in Ukraine:
  - a. Migration (both internal and external), which, on one hand, destroys small religious communities in certain territories, while on the other hand, fosters the creation of new religious communities outside of Ukraine. Migration is also affecting the demographic composition of many religious communities: some communities are "aging," while others are becoming "younger."
  - b. Persecution of certain religious organizations in occupied territories.
  - c. Strengthening of Ukrainian self-identification in religious communities, which is manifested, for example, in the transition of communities from the UOC (MP) to the OCU, or in the switch to the Ukrainian language for worship services.
  - d. Increased humanitarian, social, and psychological activities. In the early months of the war, communities actively participated in distributing humanitarian aid to their members and everyone in need. Over time, many communities began to create programs for the social integration of internally displaced believers, as well as psychological support programs for both believers and military personnel and their families. Support for the latter group is currently an urgent necessity.



# RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Documentation.** There have been committed violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes against religious communities in Ukraine, and the number of damaged and destroyed religious buildings is increasing each month. State authorities, led by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, as well as law enforcement agencies, non-governmental organizations, and international human rights organizations, should continue documenting war crimes and other violations of IHL to hold those responsible accountable in the future.
2. **Restoration.** Authorized state bodies, together with non-governmental organizations and international partners, should create mechanisms for restoring destroyed religious buildings, prepare an estimate budget to attract donor funding for the reconstruction of destroyed facilities, and restoration of usual functioning of religious communities. The state should lead the restoration of damaged monuments of national and regional significance and assist communities in rebuilding religious buildings that do not have special protective status.
3. **Awareness.** Raising awareness among the international community about the real situation regarding religious freedom in both free and occupied territories of Ukraine, as well as in the Russian Federation, should be carried out by the state and its representatives worldwide, as well as by civil society, human rights organizations, Ukrainian media, and, first and foremost, religious organizations. One of the most important things religious leaders and believers can do today is to testify to the international community about their experience of religious freedom in Ukraine. The words of religious authorities, spoken before their co-religionists in various parts of the world, can counter Russian propaganda, highlight the situation regarding the destruction of churches, the persecution of believers in occupied territories, and Russia's attempts to eliminate religious freedom and diversity in Ukraine. For its part, the state should facilitate the advocacy activities of religious leaders, allowing them to visit different countries and gain access to international media.
4. **Support for religious minorities.** While all religious communities in Ukraine are in danger during the war, religious minorities remain the most vulnerable and have additional specific needs. This particularly concerns communities that had the right to alternative (non-military) service in peacetime but now face the threat of losing their identity and social condemnation during the state of war. The state has the obligation, which is also emphasized by international institutions, to protect the rights of religious minorities. It is important to document war crimes and the damages inflicted on religious minorities by the aggressor's military. In the long term, the state, civil society, human rights organizations, and international humanitarian organizations should facilitate the effective restoration of activities for religious minority communities.
5. **Sanctions.** Almost all religious leaders in the Russian Federation have supported military actions on the territory of Ukraine, called for the continuation of hostilities, and sometimes directly encouraged the elimination of Ukrainians and everything associated with Ukrainian

identity. Russian religious actors and affiliated civil organizations participate in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian citizens, including children, to Russia and their unlawful adoption. Such individuals should be subjected to sanctions and criminal proceedings to prevent them from promoting the positions of the Russian political leadership abroad.

# PHOTO PROOFS OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY CRIMES


## Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP)



Destroyed Chapel of Archangel Michael, Chernihiv.  
Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 25, 2022.



Church of Saint George, Irpin, Romanyvka district (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, May 14, 2022.




Church of Saint George, Irpin, Romanyvka district (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, May 14, 2022.





Portable altar for services against the backdrop of the desecrated interior of the Ascension Church, Lukashivka (Chernihiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 25, 2022.




Partially restored bell tower of the Church of St. Theodosius, Chernihiv. Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 25, 2022.




Half-destroyed Church of the Nativity of the Theotokos, Viazivka (Zhytomyr region). Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, November 27, 2022.



Shot-up belfry of the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Yasnohorodka (Kyiv region). Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, December 4, 2022.



Destroyed drum of the main dome of the Church in honor of St. Faith, Hope, Charity and their mother Sophia, Saryi Saltiv (Kharkiv region). Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, June 23, 2023.



Holy Trinity Church, Hrakove (Kharkiv region). Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, June 25, 2023.






Shot-up memorial chapel at the Church of St. Paraskeva, Druzhnyia (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, May 22, 2022.



Holy Trinity Church, Irpin (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, May 14, 2022.



Ruins of the Church in honor of the Holy Apostles Andrew and Prophet Elijah, Hostomel, Mostysche district (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, June 4, 2022.



Ruined and burned cells of the Convent in Honor of the Icon of the Mother of God "The Intercessor", Fasova (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, May 22, 2022.



The ruins of St. George Church, Zavorychi (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 24, 2022.



# Orthodox Church of Ukraine



Damaged walls by large shrapnel at the Church of St. Andrew the Apostle the First-Called and of All the Saints, Bucha (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, June 25, 2022.



Shrapnel-damaged Church of the Intercession, Irpin (Kyiv region). Photo by Lyubov Kilikevska, May 28, 2022.



Shot-up dome of the Church of the Intercession, Lypivka (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, May 21, 2022.



Windows blown out by the blast wave at St. Nicholas Church in memory of the victims of Chornobyl, Kyiv. Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, March 22, 2024.





Shrapnel-damaged Church of John the Baptist, Moshchun (Kyiv region). Photo by Kateryna Zorya, August 11, 2022.



Temporary memorial sign at the site of the mass grave of Bucha residents (Kyiv region) killed by Russian occupiers. Courtyard of St. Andrew the First-Called and All Saints Church. Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, June 25, 2022.



Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker Church, large shrapnel damage, Nalyvaykivka (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 17, 2022.



The ruins of the Church of Archangel Michael and Other Heavenly Powers, Ruski Tyshky (Kharkiv region). Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, May 5, 2023.




## Roman Catholic Church



Signs of blast wave damage at St. Peter's Church, Makariv (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 17, 2022.

## Christians of the Evangelical Faith



Church Salvation, Rehabilitation Center Vosor, Motyzhyn (Kyiv region). Note from a minister who was captured by the Russians. Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 17, 2022.

## Other Religious Organizations



Mosque of the Islamic Community Sunna in Kharkiv nine months after a Russian missile strike. Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, May 6, 2023.



Ruins of the Interconfessional Protestant Mission Eurasia, Irpin (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, June 11, 2022.




Damaged monument Menorah in the memorial complex Drobysky Yar (Kharkiv region). Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, June 25, 2023.



## Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church



Crater from the explosion near the Church of the Nativity of the Most Holy Mother of God, Irpin (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, June 4, 2022.



Crater from the explosion at the Chapel of St. Elijah, Makariv (Kyiv region). Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, September 17, 2022.

## Evangelical Christians-Baptists



Irpin Bible Seminary two months after the occupiers were expelled from Kyiv region. Photo by Ruslan Khalikov, June 28, 2022.



Ruins of the House of Prayer New Life, Izyum (Kharkiv region). Photo by Anton Leshchynskyi, November 11, 2023.



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